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I. INTRODUCTION
The recent passage of the President's crime bill, which includes a
ban by the federal government on the purchase or sale of certain
* J.D., 1995, Florida State University.
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"assault weapons,"' has forced the usually ignored Second Amend-
ment into the national spotlight. While the recent Republican takeover
of Congress decreases the possibility of additional federal restrictions
on gun ownership in the near future, existing federal firearms legisla-
tion keeps alive the question of whether the Second Amendment guar-
antees to the individual a constitutional right to bear arms.2 Also, the
April 19, 1995 bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City alleg-
edly by individuals loosely connected with so-called "militia" groups,
has served as a catalyst to bring the Second Amendment into the spot-
light.3 Adding to the attention, the academic realm has challenged the
viability of the "state's right" interpretation of the Second Amend-
ment, 4 an interpretation which has been embraced by at least six fed-
eral circuit courts.
1. Congress specifically banned the following weapons: Norinco, Mitchell, and Poly Tech-
nologies Avtomat Kalashnikoves (all models); Action Arms Israeli Military Industries UZI and
Galil; Beretta Ar70 (SC-70); Colt AR-15; Fabrique National FN/FAL, FN/LAR, and FNC;
SWD M-10, M-11, M-I1/9, and M-12; Steyr AUG; INTRATEC TEC-9, TEC-DC9, and TEC-
22; and revolving cylinder shotguns. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(30)(A), 922 (1994). "Assault weapons"
are defined as semi-automatic rifles (one round is fired for each pull of the trigger) that have the
ability to accept two or more of the following: a folding or telescoping stock, a pistol grip that
"protrudes conspicuously beneath the action of the weapon," a bayonet mount, a flash suppres-
sor or threaded barrel designed to accommodate one, or a grenade launcher. Id. § 921(a)(30)(B).
Such adornments have no effect on the actual mechanics of the weapon. According to some, the
Supreme Court ruled that these types of weapons merit the highest constitutional protection. See
infra part III.A.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Lopez casts doubt on the constitu-
tionality of federal regulation of the mere possession of firearms. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). The
Lopez decision is discussed infra at note 114.
2. Some excellent research and scholarship has recently emerged indicating that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right, including: Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition
and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REv. 204 (1983); Sanford
Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989); Jay R. Wagner, Gun
Control Legislation and the Intent of the Second Amendment: To What Extent Is There an
Individual Right To Keep and Bear Arms?, 37 VIL. L. REV. 1407 (1992); Robert Dowlut, Fed-
eral and State Constitutional Guarantees to Arms, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 59 (1989); Nelson
Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right to Self-Preservation, 39 ALA. L.
REv. 103 (1987); Nicholas J. Johnson, Beyond the Second Amendment: An Individual Right to
Arms Viewed Through the Ninth Amendment, 24 RtrrGaRs L.J. 1 (1992); Thomas M. Moncure,
The Second Amendment Ain't About Hunting, 34 How. L.J. 589 (1991).
3. E.g., In Broad Daylight-Terrorism Hits Home: U.S. Building Bombed; Dead Include
Children, WALL ST. J., April 20, 1995, at Al; Jim Galloway, Oklahoma Bombing: The After-
math, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 3, 1995, at All ("Kingman, Ariz., the sometime home of
bombing suspect Timothy McVeigh, sits at the desert intersection of America's two symbols of
independence: cars and guns."); Explosive Backlash: Some Citizens Disavow Extreme-Right
Views in Wake of Bombing-Have 'Angry White Men' Gone Too Far? Bad News for Nation's
Gun Lobby, WAL.L ST. J., April 24, 1995, at Al (" 'It's going to be much harder for politicians
to vigorously advocate repeal of bans on assault weapons, much harder to advocate for con-
cealed weapons,' because these issues are so closely identified with militia groups, says Daniel
Levitas, an Atlanta-based expert on hate crimes and extreme-right groups.").
4. The state's right interpretation is discussed infra in part II.A.
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Part II of this Comment surveys the modern Second Amendment
landscape, emphasizing the all-important debate over whether the Sec-
ond Amendment affords rights to individuals or to 5tates. Part III of
the Comment examines the misinterpretation of the Second Amend-
ment by the lower federal judiciary. It includes discussion of several
key state's right decisions and offers the foundation for the premise of
the Comment.
This Comment embraces the individual rights interpretation of the
Second Amendment. According to that interpretation, the Second
Amendment grants5 to the citizen the right to keep and bear arms, a
right now floundering between the Scylla of state police and militia
powers and the Charybdis of federal regulation. The Comment ar-
gues, however, that federal firearms regulation is unconstitutional
whether Second Amendment rights are interpreted as belonging to the
individual or to the states.
The heart of this Comment is, thus, found in part IV, which pro-
poses and explores constitutional challenges to federal firearms regu-
lation. These arguments are unique because they do not depend upon
acceptance by courts of the individual rights interpretation. Indeed,
they concede the continued acceptance of the state's right interpreta-
tion of the Second Amendment by some lower federal courts. Such
challenges can be viewed as a means of questioning federal firearms
regulation-and as creating a more expansive interpretation of the
Second Amendment-by using contemporary case law.
II. DUELING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT:
A STATE'S RIGHT VS. AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHT
"That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among
Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed,-
That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of
these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it .. 6
With these words, Thomas Jefferson condensed into a paragraph
the Lockean views of government and the individual which to this day
remain particularly American. The right to keep and bear arms is in
many ways the ultimate right, for it guarantees the citizenry a
5. Use of the word "grant" is perhaps inappropriate if one views the Constitution as an
acknowledgement of the already existing natural rights of individuals, and not as a benefit or
privilege provided by the State. In this Comment, the former view is embraced.
6. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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mechanism with which to overthrow oppressive government. 7 In the
Declaration of Independence, Jefferson observed that "when a long
train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object
evinces a design to reduce [the people] under absolute Despotism, it is
[the people's right], it is their duty, to throw off such Government,
and to provide new Guards for their future security. ' When the
United States emerged from the overthrow of tyrannical English dom-
ination, the founding fathers understood the danger of unfettered
government and were justifiably suspicious of a "Military independ-
ent of and superior to the Civil Power." 9
The right to keep and bear arms, put in a more universal and time-
less way, is the means by which the people retain ultimate ownership
and control of their government.' 0 Philosophical underpinnings aside,
the debate in courtrooms and legal journals today centers on the ap-
plication and meaning of the Second Amendment.
A. The State's Right Interpretation
The foundation of the state's right-or collective right'-interpre-
tation of the Second Amendment is found in the Militia Clause of the
7. "In other words, the people may abolish their government whenever it ceases to protect
natural rights and becomes destructive to the ends for which it was established." J.W. PELTA-
SON, CoRWIN AND PELTASON'S UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTIN 5 (6th ed. 1973). In an open
and free nation such as the United States, the necessity of such a revolution would be unlikely,
given the efficacy of elections and free speech to address grievances against the government. Id.
Jefferson qualified the people's right to overthrow destructive government by adding that "Pru-
dence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light
and transient causes." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
8. TI DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
9. Id. para. 14. This was one of the many grievances Jefferson included against King
George III.
10. Among the charges leveled against the King by Jefferson was that "He has kept among
us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the Consent of the legislature" and that "He has
affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power." Id. paras. 13,
14. Being armed was a condition that
"Americans possess over the people of almost every nation." The despotisms of Eu-
rope were charged with being "afraid to trust the people with arms." An armed citi-
zenry serves as a deterrent to governmental oppression because the people have the
latent and implicit power to "rise up to defend their just rights, and compel their
rulers to respect the laws." Totalitarian governments of the left and right in the
twentieth century consider an armed people a threat and seek to disarm them.
Robert Dowlut & Janet A. Knoop, State Constitutions and the Right To Keep and Bear Arms, 7
OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 177, 182 (1982) (citing in part THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
11. Courts and many academics use the terms "collective right" and "state's right" inter-
changeably. Another interpretation, distinct in origin from the state's right view, is also some-
times referred to as the "collective right" or "collectivist" interpretation. This other
interpretation, referred to in this Comment as the "discrete collectivist" or "nebulous entity"
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Constitution,1 2 which gives Congress the power to "provide for the
calling forth of the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress
Insurrections and repel Invasions," and to "provide for the organiz-
ing, arming, and disciplining" of the Militia. 3 State's right propo-
nents maintain that the Second Amendment was a response to the fear
of states that Congress might disarm their militias through the powers
granted to it by this clause, leaving the states with no means to defend
themselves against federal tyranny.1 4
The courts and scholars have produced two versions of the state's
right view, referred to in this Comment as the "weak-form" and the
"strong-form." Under the weak-form, states and members of state
militias have standing to assert Second Amendment rights against fed-
eral infringement."3 Proponents of the strong-form argue that, while
the Second Amendment did at one time protect states from federal
regulation of their militias, in the modern world, the maintenance of
the National Guard satisfies the purposes of the Amendment.16 Few
courts have adopted the strong-form, possibly because it requires an
unapologetic policy-making most courts would rather avoid. Also,
rather daunting textual, historical, and analytical obstacles face the
strong-form, 7 which make it less palatable to courts bound by con-
trary Supreme Court precedent."8 Implicit in the strong-form view is
theory (discussed infra in subsection C of this part) has been rendered all but dead from desue-
tude.
Some commentators refuse to use the term "collective right" when referring to the state's
right interpretation in order to avoid confusion with the discrete collectivist interpretation. See
Kates, supra note 2, at 212 n.31. This Comment is largely based on federal case law, and given
that federal courts use the term "collective right" to refer to the state's right interpretation, not
mixing the terms would risk confusion of another sort; that is, the term "collective right" in
federal cases should be read as state's right language. The terms will also be used interchange-
ably to avoid needless repetition.
12. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, 9 8, cls. 15-16.
13. Id.
14. Kates, supra note 2, at 212. "During the Revolution, and the subsequent period of the
Articles of Confederation, the states loomed larger than the federal government and jealously
guarded their prerogatives against it." Id.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948
(1976); see infra part III.
16. E.g., Kates, supra note 2, at 213. Under a strict reading of the state's right view, only
states have standing to assert the Second Amendment. Some state's right proponents argue that
state challenges are no longer necessary since "any value the amendment might presently have
for them is satisfied by their federally-provided National Guard structure." Id. Collective right
courts have rejected such a literal approach, and have implicitly held that individuals can raise
Second Amendment challenges under certain circumstances. See infra notes 17-20 and accompa-
nying text.
17. The strong-form version is discussed infra in part Ill.B, where the Eighth Circuit's
holding in United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1614,
(1993) is examined.
18. The Supreme Court's discussion of the militia in United States v. Miller contradicts the
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the notion that, since government has behaved itself so far, while pos-
sessing awesome military capability, there is no longer a need to main-
tain an armed citizenry as a deterrent to federal overreaching. 9 To
make their arguments, strong-form proponents must prove that the
United States has outgrown the need for strong civilian deterrence. In
light of the history of government, politics, and revolution throughout
the world, this is a heavy burden indeed. 20
B. The Individual Right Interpretation
The individual right interpretation of the Second Amendment,
which asserts that citizens have a personal right to keep and bear
arms, finds support among the majority of Americans. 2' The individ-
ual right view incorporates the state's right argument that the Second
Amendment was motivated in part by the states' fear of a strong fed-
eral standing army. 22 However, proponents of the individual right
interpretation cite other historical factors, such as the deterrence of
governmental oppression and the right to personal defense, to explain
why the Second Amendment affords rights to individuals.23 In addi-
tion, individual right proponents argue that even if protection of state
militias were the sole purpose of the Second Amendment, the right to
keep and bear arms would remain an individual right, since this goal
is best achieved by keeping firearms in the hands of the citizenry it-
self.24
The individual right interpretation is strongly supported by the text
of the Second Amendment itself; that is, the phrase "the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms" means exactly what it says. The pre-
amble "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a
strong-form notion that the National Guard comprises the modern militia. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
For a discussion of the Miller decision, see infra part III.A.
19. This argument is discussed infra in part IV.
20. "The background of war, revolution, and violence against which our institutions were
formed represents much more the norm of human existence than the domestic peace and stability
that Americans have enjoyed in this century." Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Right To Keep and
Bear Arms Under the Tennessee Constitution, 61 TEN. L. RFv. 647, 669 (1994).
21. See, e.g., Kates, supra note 2, at 206-07 (individual right interpretation is "accepted by
a majority of the general populace who, though supporting the idea of controlling guns, increas-
ingly oppose their prohibition"); Lund, supra note 2, at 115 ("The 'collective right' interpreta-
tion has become dominant among the courts and academics, while laypersons have generally
favored the 'individual right' interpretation.").
22. "[T]he individual right advocate may accept the state's right theory and simply assert
that, even though one of the amendment's purposes may have been to protect the states' militias,
another was to protect the individual right to arms." Kates, supra note 2, at 213 (footnotes
omitted).
23. Dowlut & Knoop, supra note 10, at 180-84 (citing in part THE FEDERALIST No. 46
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
24. "Indeed, evidence suggests it was precisely by protecting the individual that the Framers
intended to protect the militia." Kates, supra note 2. at 213.
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free State" is merely an acknowledgement that an armed citizenry is
necessary to prevent tyranny by government. 21 Under the individual
right view, the term "the people" has the same meaning in the Second
Amendment as it does throughout the Bill of Rights. 26
If the Second Amendment protects an individual right, the question
arises whether the Amendment is incorporated against the states. Op-
ponents of such a full-incorporationist view point to United States v.
Cruikshank27 and Presser v. Illinois,' two Supreme Court cases which
expressly held that the Second Amendment was a restriction on the
powers of only the federal government, leaving states free to regulate
firearms as they wished. The Northern District of Illinois cited these
cases in Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove,29 in which the court de-
nied a Second Amendment challenge brought by handgun owners
against a local ordinance which prohibited possession and use of
handguns.3 0 The Quilici court reasoned that, since the Supreme Court
has never reconsidered the holding in Presser, that case "stands as the
most recent pronouncement on the issue of whether the Second
Amendment was incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment so as
to limit the power of the states."'"
However, the incorporation issue is far from settled. Professor Lev-
inson points out that the first incorporation decision by the Court
25. Judge Cooley explained the purpose of the Second Amendment preamble:
It may be supposed from the phraseology of this provision that the right to keep and
bear arms was only guaranteed to the militia; but this would be an interpretation not
warranted by intent. The militia, as has been elsewhere explained, consists of those
persons who, under the law, are liable to the performance of military duty, and are
officered and enrolled for service when called upon. But the law may make provision
for the enrollment of all who are fit to perform military duty, or of a small number
only, or it may wholly omit to make any provision at all ....
THOMAS COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAl. LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMRICA 289-99 (3d ed. 1898).
26. In a recent Supreme Court decision, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the term "the
people" has the same meaning (a reference to individual citizens) in the First, Second, Fourth,
Ninth, and Tenth Amendments. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265, reh'g
denied, 494 U.S. 1092 (1990). In United States v. Hale, a case discussed extensively infra at part
III.B.4, the Eighth Circuit dismissed Chief Justice Rehnquist's words as dicta. 978 F.2d 1016,
1020 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1614 (1993).
27. 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875) (Second Amendment right "means no more than that it shall
not be infringed by Congress. This is one of the amendments that has no other effect than to
restrict the national government .... ").
28. 116 U.S. 252, 267 (1886) (rejecting claim that Second Amendment invalidated an Illi-
nois statute prohibiting "any body of men whatever, other than the regular organized volunteer
militia of this State, and the troops of the United States . . . to drill or parade with arms in any
city or town of this state, without the license of the governor thereof").
29. 532 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D. I1. 1981). The Seventh Circuit later affirmed the district
court's holding. 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983) (discussed infra
in part III.B.3).
30. Quilici, 532 F. Supp. at 1180.
31. Id. at 1181.
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came eleven years after Presser,3 2 and he poses this intriguing ques-
tion: "Why... should Cruikshank and Presser be regarded as bind-
ing precedent any more than the other 'pre-incorporation' decisions
refusing to apply given aspects of the Bill of Rights against the
states?" 33
C. The Discrete Collectivist 34 or "Nebulous Entity" Interpretation
Proponents of the discrete collectivist theory maintain that "the
people" in the Second Amendment refers to the collective body of
citizens," and not to individuals or to states. Dowlut and Knoop
observe that "[tihe collectivists essentially claim that there is a nebu-
lous entity that exists somewhere between the individual and the state
which is so important that the Framers protected it with a constitu-
tional right. "36 The result is that no one has standing to assert Second
Amendment rights, since "the people" has been interpreted into a
philosophical mist.37
The nebulous entity theory was first unveiled by the Kansas Su-
preme Court in City of Salina v. Blaksley,5 but has not gained accep-
tance by federal courts.39 "The collectivists' argument should not be
32. Levinson, supra note 2, at 653.
33. Id.
34. This interpretation will not be referred to as the "collective right" interpretation, even
if the use of "collective" more appropriately describes this view. See supra note 11.
35. This collectivist approach is laced with undertones of Hegel's "abstract Universality,"
whereby "[tihe interest of History is detached from individuals, but these gain for themselves
abstract, formal Universality. The Universal subjugates the individuals; they have to merge their
own interests in it ...." Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Philosophy of History, in ROMANTI-
cism Am EvoLrroN 165, 169 (Bruce Wilshire ed., 1985). Levinson points out that collectivist
views of the Second Amendment, such as the discrete collectivist interpretation and the state's
right interpretation, are compatible with the neo-republican notion of a collective people as con-
trasted with the individual. Levinson, supra note 2, at 650 ("one of the most interesting points in
regard to the new historiography of the Second Amendment [is] its linkage to conceptions of
republican political order. Contemporary admirers of republican theory use it as a source both
of critiques of more individualist liberal theory and of positive insight into the way we today
might reorder our political lives."). The "organic community" of the civic republicans bears
striking resemblance to the discrete collectivists' body of the collective citizenry. "Civic republi-
canism is by nature a collectivist political theory. In other words, civic republicanism gives pri-
mary empirical and ethical significance to collective, rather than individual human endeavors."
Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 801, 811
(1993).
36. See Dowlut & Knoop, supra note 10, at 189. "This essentially means that the right to
bear arms protects no one and guarantees nothing, for regardless of how draconian and uncon-
stitutional a law may be, no individual would have standing to challenge such a law." Id. at 186-
87.
37. Id.
38. 83 P. 619 (Kan. 1905).
39. See, e.g., Kates, supra note 2, at 212 n.13. Kates dismissed the nebulous entity theory as
1995] IN SEARCH OF THE LOST AMENDMENT
followed by courts because it has no historical support, no case law
support prior to the Kansas decision, and is illogical since the very
concept of a right is individual."' 4 However, some commentators ar-
gue that this theory, and not the collective right theory, is the founda-
tion of modern federal case law. 41
D. Academia: Asleep in the Ivory Tower
While most Americans understand the right to keep and bear arms
as an individual right, the state's right view has been predominant in
academia.4 2 In his text on the Constitution, Professor Peltason sternly
concluded that the Second Amendment "provides no constitutional
right for a private citizen to retain weapons." ' 43 One is hard-pressed to
find any mention of the Second Amendment in constitutional law
textbooks 44 or constitutional treatises. 45 Even the rights-oriented
American Civil Liberties Union denies that the Second Amendment
protects individuals and, in fact, supports governmental restriction
and control of gun ownership. 46
The Second Amendment has thus been left to stand in the corner;
indeed, one commentator analogizes the Second Amendment to an
"embarrassing relative, whose mention brings a quick change of sub-
'patently wrong." He then recited the numerous infirmities of that theory:
If the amendment was intended to guarantee a right to the people (and not to the
state), it is self-contradictory to say that because the right was conferred on everyone,
no single person may assert it, or indeed, to describe something that guarantees noth-
ing to any specific person or entity as a 'right' at all. Thus, the discrete 'collective
right' theory fails to meet Chief Justice Marshall's elementary test for constitutional
construction: 'It cannot be presumed that any clause in the Constitution is intended to
be without effect .... ' Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (Cranch) 137 (1803)[.]
Id.
40. Dowlut & Knoop, supra note 10, at 191.
41. See Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in the Twentieth
Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REv. 5 (1989). This argument is
discussed infra in part IV.
42. This is not so true today, as several law review articles have emerged which cast doubt
on the validity of the state's right interpretation. See supra note 2. Many scholars who champion
the individual right view are practitioners, including Stephen P. Halbrook, Don B. Kates, Jr.,
and Robert Dowlut.
43. PELTASON, supra note 7, at 122.
44. "Other than its being included in the text of the Constitution that all of the casebooks
reprint, a reader would have no reason to believe that the Amendment exists or could possibly be
of interest to the constitutional analyst." Levinson, supra note 2, at 639 n.14.
45. Id. (treatises by Tribe, and the team of Nowak, Rotunda, and Young, while at least
acknowledging the existence of the Second Amendment, "marginalize [it] by relegating it to
footnotes; it becomes what a deconstructionist might call a 'supplement' to the ostensibly 'real'
Constitution that is privileged by discussion in the text").
46. "That bastion of individual rights, the American Civil Liberties Union-a member of
the organization of the National Coalition to Ban Handguns-emphatically denies that the Sec-
ond Amendment has anything to do with individuals." Lund, supra note 2, at 121 n.45.
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ject to other, more respectable family members." 7 Because of this
shunning, questionable Second Amendment decisions-such as those
discussed infra in part III-go unchallenged.
The conspicuous distance that many academics place between them-
selves and the Second Amendment is not so surprising since those in a
position to mold and move the law have a natural tendency to do so in
a manner that expands their power and influence." Professor Johnson
speculated that "[t]he social, political, and economic elite may have
realistic expectations of substantially impacting public policy, and
they are the least likely to fear collective power turned against them.
They might fairly consider government to be trustworthy, benevolent,
and directed in pursuit of their interests. ' 49 Judge Bork noted that
"one would expect to see the law become less restrictive where it im-
pinges on the intellectual class's interests. Freedom of speech is, of
course, the sine qua non of the intellectual class."5 0 Indeed, the intelli-
gentsia fiercely defend the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as well
as the Commerce Clause, but give an icy reception to rights which
affirm the people's ownership of government. To many in academia,
an armed citizenry at worst offends what they believe is in the interest
of good social policy," and at best is distasteful. 2
47. Levinson, supra note 2, at 658. Professor Levinson titled his article The Embarrassing
Second Amendment to suggest that the Second Amendment "may be profoundly embarrassing
to many who both support such regulation and view themselves as committed to zealous adher-
ence to the gill of Rights (such as most members of the ACLU)." Id. at 642. Levinson's article is
a study in intellectual honesty. A proponent of gun control, Levinson removes the political blin-
ders which would otherwise cloud his examination of the meaning and purpose of the Amend-
ment. Levinson concludes that his likely audience, the "elite, liberal portion of the public" (in
which he includes himself), should consider the possibility that "'our' views of the Amendment
. might themselves be equally deserving of the 'tendentious' label." Id.
48. See infra note 50.
49. Johnson, supra note 2, at 72.
50. RoBERT Boiuc, Tim ANTITRUST PARADox 423-24 (1978).
51. See Levinson, supra note 2, at 642. Levinson offers the following view from inside the
tower:
I cannot help but suspect that the best explanation for the absence of the Second
Amendment from the legal consciousness of the elite bar, including that component
found in the legal academy, is derived from a mixture of sheer opposition to the idea
of private ownership of guns and the perhaps subconscious fear that altogether plausi-
ble, perhaps even "winning," interpretations of the Second Amendment would pres-
ent real hurdles to those of us supporting prohibitory regulation.
Id. (citations omitted).
Crime has become a major problem in the United States, and it is believed that gun control,
particularly with regard to "assault weapons" and handguns, will alleviate violent crime com-
mitted with firearms. See Gordon Witkin, Should You Own a Gun?, U.S. NEws & W.R., Aug.
15, 1994, at 24 (Witkin contrasts the views of gun and crime expert Gary Kleck, Professor of
Criminology at Florida State University, and author of Crime Control Through Private Use of
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III. THE FEDERAL ASSAULT ON THE CITIZEN'S RIGHT
To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS
In light of the compelling historical and textual indicia supporting
the individual right interpretation, the performance of the federal ju-
diciary in construing the Second Amendment is disappointing. Even
Justice Douglas, whose "opinions were marked by a fierce commit-
ment to individual rights and distrust of government," 3 seemed
unconcerned with the erosion of Second Amendment rights. 54 What-
ever the source of complacency among some federal courts, the case
law is hardly watertight.
A. United States v. Miller
With United States v. Miller in 1939, the Supreme Court released its
only modern Second Amendment decision." While seemingly embrac-
ing the state's right interpretation, the Court devoted significant
Armed Force, 35 Soc. PROBS. 1 (Feb. 1988), with those of a physician who advocates gun con-
trol).
52. Johnson points to the frequently encountered tactic of "stereotyping gun owners and
dismissing any arguments supporting individual firearms ownership by personifying gun owners
or advocates in condescending, pejorative terms." Johnson, supra note 2, at 72. As an example,
he points to an article by Wendy Brown titled Guns, Cowboys, Philadelphia Mayors and Civic
Republicanism: On Sanford Levinson's The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J.
661 (1989), in which Professor Brown recounts an encounter with a sportsman who helped her
start her stalled car at a trailhead in the Sierra Nevadas:
My rescuer was wearing a cap with the words "NRA freedom" inscribed on it. This
was, I thought at the time perfectly counterpoised to the injunction "Resist Illegiti-
mate Authority" springing from my tee shirt. The slogans our bodies bore appeared
to mark with elegant economy our attachment to opposite ends of the political and
cultural universe-he preparing to shoot the wildlife I came to revere, he living out of
his satellite-dished Winnebago and me out of my dusty backpack, he sustained by his
guns and beer, me by my Nietzsche and trail mix.
Brown, supra, at 666. One wonders whether Brown in retrospect recognized the elegant congru-
ity in those slogans, or that in the context of a right to bear arms for individual defense, the
sportsman shared the company of Hobbes, Harrington, Sir Walter Raleigh, Blackstone, Aristo-
tle, Montesquieu, and Sir Thomas Moore, among others. See Kates, supra note 2, at 232-33.
53. STONE ET AL., CoNsTrrTrioNAL LAw Lxi (2d ed. 1991).
54. Justice Douglas offered the following view of the importance of the Fourth Amendment
compared with the Second:
Critics say that proposals like [the state's right interpretation] water down the Second
Amendment. Our decisions belie that argument, for the Second Amendment, as
noted, was designed to keep alive the militia. But if watering-down is the rule of the
day, I would prefer to water down the Second rather than the Fourth Amendment.
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 151 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
55. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
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discussion to the purpose of the Second Amendment, and to the im-
portance of independent state militias.56
Miller was charged with transporting an unregistered sawed-off
shotgun across state lines in violation of the National Firearms Act.57
Through its registration requirements, the Act imposed a prohibitive
tax upon certain weapons transported in interstate commerce. The
trial court voided the indictment, holding that the Second Amendment
prohibited such federal regulation.58 The Supreme Court reversed and
reinstated the indictment, stressing that the defendants had attacked
the indictment only, and had introduced no evidence to support the
claim that sawed-off shotguns were protected under the Second
Amendment.19
In upholding the constitutionality of the National Firearms Act as
applied to Miller, the Court wrote that the Second Amendment was
included in the Bill of Rights to "assure the continuation and render
possible the effectiveness" of the Militia described in Article I, Sec-
tion 8, Clause 16.61 The Court, through Justice McReynolds, outlined
56. "This holding has been widely misunderstood, most surprisingly by proponents of the
individual right position. They have gone so far as to denigrate its authority by pointing out that
it was rendered on the basis of only the Government's one-sided briefing." Kates, supra note 2,
at 248.
57. Miller, 307 U.S. at 175. The National Firearms Act of 1934 was enacted during the
violent days of Prohibition, when certain types of firearms, particularly sawed-off shotguns and
machine guns, became notorious tools of gangsters.
58. Miller, 307 U.S. at 175.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 178.
61. Section 8 states in part that Congress shall have the power
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress
insurrections and repel Invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining,
the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of
the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Offi-
cers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by
Congress.
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8. The meaning of the term "militia" as used in this section is very impor-
tant to the state's right/individual right debate. Those in the weak-form state's right camp point
to this section as the rationale behind the Second Amendment. Kates, supra note 2, at 211-12.
According to this view, states were not willing to give the federal government control over their
militias (that is, their armed citizenry) without assurances that the federal government would not
be able to use its authority to disarm the militias. Id. at 212.
According to the strong-form interpretation, the § 8 militia is now the National Guard. The
National Guard is a cooperative venture, with each state directing its respective National Guard
in peacetime. However, even when the National Guard is not under federal control, Congress
still holds "a considerable degree of control through conditions attached to grants of money to
the states for the National Guard." PELTASON, supra note 7, at 63. Under the strong-form, the
Second Amendment is of no relevance today, since the militia has evolved over time into the
National Guard. See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 41.
If not for the Miller opinion, those in the individual right camp would not care what the
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the standard courts must apply to assess the constitutionality of con-
gressional regulation of firearms:
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use
of a 'shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length'
at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation and
efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second
Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an
instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon
is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could
contribute to the common defense. 62
The standard established by Miller can be clearly understood by re-
versing the Court's factual finding and examining the result. If Miller
had demonstrated to the Court that sawed-off shotguns were ration-
ally related to the efficiency and preservation of the militia, then fed-
eral regulation of such weapons would be unconstitutional. This
simple Gedanken experiment exposes the very heart of the Miller deci-
sion: weapons which are not used for ordinary militia purposes, or do
not "contribute to the common defense," are not protected by the
Second Amendment. A useful analogy can be made to the First
Amendment; courts will not strike down regulation of unprotected
classes of expression, such as obscenity or libel.
Scholars have debated the meaning of the Court's holding in Miller.
Kates focuses on the Court's extensive discussion of the history of the
militia in America 3 and categorizes Miller as a case which ultimately
upholds the individual right view. 4 The Court's definition of who
comprises the militia reinforces his reading:
The Militia which the States were expected to maintain and train is
set in contrast with Troops which they were forbidden to keep
without the consent of Congress. The sentiment of the time strongly
disfavored standing armies; the common view was that adequate
defense of country and laws could be secured through the Militia-
civilians primarily, soldiers on occasion .... And further, that
ordinarily when called for service these men were expected to appear
Militia Clause meant, since individuals could assert the Second Amendment regardless. Indeed,
congressional authority under § 8 would thus pose no real threat of federal oppression, since
ultimate military power would always remain vested in the people.
62. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 (citing Aymette v. State of Tennessee, 21 Tenn. 152, 2 Humph.,
Tenn., 154, 158 (Tenn. 1840)).
63. Kates, supra note 2, at 248-50.
64. Id. at 249.
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bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use
at the time.(,
The Court's definition of the militia, coupled with the fact that the
Court's "reasonable relationship" test was directed to the weapon
alone, casts doubt on claims that Miller was a state's right decision.
Miller's standing to assert Second Amendment rights was never ques-
tioned by the Court. The premise of the state's right view is, after all,
that the Second Amendment is not applicable to individuals. Going
back to the Gedanken experiment, if Miller had produced evidence
that sawed-off shotguns were reasonably related to a well-regulated
militia, Second Amendment protection from federal regulation would
apply.
At the same time, it cannot be said that the Miller Court fully em-
braced the individual right interpretation, since the Court did not read
any other interest into the right to keep and bear arms beyond the
militia interest. While this holding has implications regarding the
types of weapons that may or may not be regulated by the federal
government, it by no means shifts Second Amendment protections
from the citizen to the state. The meaning of Miller will continue to be
debated until the Supreme Court revisits the Second Amendment. The
now fifty-six-year-old opinion unfortunately left much to the imagina-
tion, and some lower federal courts have vivid imaginations indeed.
B. A Tragicomedy of Errors: The Misinterpretation of Miller and
the Priestcraft of the Collective Right Courts
1. The First Circuit
Some federal courts have viewed the holding of Miller through
state's right lenses, and through time, lens upon lens, have blurred the
meaning of the Second Amendment beyond recognition. The First
Circuit began this process in 1942 with Cases v. United States,66 the
first state's right case among the federal circuit courts.
Cases was convicted under the Federal Firearms Act.67 Unlike
Miller, who was indicted for transporting a particular type of weapon
through interstate commerce, Cases was convicted under the Act's
prohibition against the transportation and reception of firearms and
65. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178-79 (emphasis added). Lund cites this language as indicating a
clear repudiation by the Court of the state's right theory. Lund, supra note 2, at 110.
66. 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 770 (1943).
67. Id. at 919.
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ammunition by convicted felons. 6 The Cases court acknowledged that
under Miller the federal government could not "prohibit the posses-
sion or use of any weapon which has any reasonable relationship to
the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia." 6 9 However,
the Cases court proceeded to ignore the Miller holding, stating that it
probably was not intended to provide a general rule for all cases 70 and
was "outdated," despite preceding Cases by only three and one-half
years .71
The Cases court's refusal to apply directly the Miller standard re-
flected its concern that the Miller test would absolutely bar federal
regulation of anything other than antiques, since almost any other
weapon would bear a reasonable relationship to the efficiency and
preservation of a well-regulated militia.72 In rendering its decision, the
Cases court was also motivated by a fear that, if the Miller holding
were accepted as the general rule, Congress would be unable to pre-
vent militia members from possessing or using "distinctly military
arms," including machine guns, trench mortars, anti-tank guns, or
anti-aircraft guns, "even though under the circumstances surrounding
such possession or use it would be inconceivable that a private person
could have any legitimate reason for having such a weapon. 7 3
The Cases court relieved the inevitable tension between Miller and
its own holding through a subtle but crucial alteration of the Miller
reasonable relationship inquiry. While the Miller court scrutinized the
firearm's militia utility, the Cases court further inquired into whether
the defendant's use of the weapon bore a reasonable relationship to
militia purposes. The First Circuit noted that no evidence linked Cases
to a military organization or demonstrated that his use of the weapon
was tied to a military career. 74 The court thus narrowed those able to
raise Second Amendment defenses to those in "military organiza-
tions" whose use or possession of a firearm furthers a state's militia
purposes. 75 By stretching and massaging language from Miller into a
68. Id.
69. Id. at 922.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. The court noted that, under Miller, Congress could regulate firearms such as "a
flintlock musket or a matchlock harquebus." Id. This concern is discussed infra in part IV.C.
73. 131 F.2d at 922.
74. Id. at 922-23 ("[T]he only inference possible is that the appellant at the time charged in
the indictment was in possession of, transporting, and using the firearm and ammunition purely
and simply on a frolic of his own and without any thought or intention of contributing to the
efficacy of the well regulated militia which the Second Amendment was designed to foster as
necessary to the security of a free state.").
75. Id. at 922-23 ("While the weapon may be capable of military use ... there is no evi-
dence that the appellant was or ever had been a member of any military organization or that his
use of the weapon ... was in preparation for a military career.").
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shape for which it was never intended, Cases provided future courts
with the leeway to find Second Amendment protections inapplicable
to individuals.7 The Cases court did not, however, go so far as to
adopt a strict reading of the state's right interpretation of the Second
Amendment, which would deny standing to everything and everyone
except the states.
The Cases court cemented its restriction of the individual right ap-
proach by citing the nineteenth-century Supreme Court decisions of
Cruikshank and Presser,77 both decided before the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporation era,78 for the proposition that the Second
Amendment does not confer rights upon the individual:
The right to keep and bear arms is not a right conferred upon the
people by the federal constitution. Whatever rights ... the people
may have depend upon local legislation; the only function of the
Second Amendment being to prevent the federal government and the
federal government only from infringing that right. 9
2. The Sixth Circuit
In Stevens v. United States,80 the Sixth Circuit cited Miller as a
state's right case, and held that "[s]ince the Second Amendment right
'to keep and bear Arms' applies only to the right of the State to main-
tain a militia and not to the individual's right to bear arms, there can
be no serious claim to any express constitutional right to possess a
firearm." 8 The Stevens decision marked the beginning of widespread
acceptance of the state's right interpretation among lower federal
courts.82
76. It is true that the Miller test includes the words "possession or use," but the Supreme
Court's sole attention was directed at the relationship between the sawed-off shotgun and the
militia. No mention was made of Miller's militia status. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
77. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252,
265 (1886). Before portions of the Bill of Rights were incorporated against the states, all amend-
ments were interpreted in such a manner. See Kates, supra note 2, at 253-57.
78. With the Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), the Supreme Court be-
gan to construe the recently added Fourteenth Amendment. PELTASON, supra note 7, at 155, 157.
The Court held that the Amendment "conferred no new rights upon United States citizens but
merely made explicit a federal guarantee against state abridgement of already established
rights." Id. at 157. Since the Slaughter House Cases, the Court has gradually held most of the
rights guaranteed in the first eight amendments applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment due process clause. STONE aT AL., supra note 53, at 778. The Second Amendment
has not yet been explicitly incorporated.
79. Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 770 (1943)
(emphasis added).
80. 440 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1971).
81. Id. at 149.
82. With regard to the state's right interpretation among federal courts, the Stevens court
picked up where the Cases court left off, ushering the state's right view into the circuits.
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The Sixth Circuit followed the Stevens decision with United States
v. Warin , 3 a 1976 case which is a textbook weak-form state's right
decision. The Warin court, citing its prior decision in Stevens, held
that the Second Amendment applies only to the right of a state to
maintain a militia, referring to it as a "collective right of the mili-
tia."
. Warin was convicted of willfully and knowingly possessing a 9mm
prototype submachine gun which was not registered to him, in viola-
tion of federal law. 5 Warin, claiming to be a member of Ohio's sed-
entary militia,86 challenged his conviction by arguing that the federal
regulation infringed on his right to keep and bear arms.17 An engineer
and developer of firearms, Warin had built the weapon himself with
the intention of offering the federal government an improved military
firearm.8 The Sixth Circuit did not dispute findings of fact from the
trial court that submachine guns bear some reasonable relationship to
the preservation or efficiency of the military forces, 89 that Warin was
not a member of Ohio's "active militia," 90 and that the weapon was
not registered to him as required by federal law. 9'
The Warin court specifically analyzed, and deferred to, Ohio's consti-
tution and regulatory scheme. 92 Under Ohio law, members of the organ-
ized militia are exempt from a state law making it unlawful to "acquire,
have, carry, or use any dangerous ordnance" such as the automatic
weapon owned by Warin.93 Since Warin was only subject to membership
in the militia under the Ohio Constitution, and was thus only a "seden-
tary militia" member, the statutory exemption was inapplicable. 94 The
analysis by the Sixth Circuit in Warin follows the Cases court's holding
83. 530 F.2d 103 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976).
84. Id. at 106.
85. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d), 5871 (1974).
86. Warin did not claim membership in an organized militia such as the Ohio National
Guard, but rather claimed membership in Ohio's sedentary militia, whose members included:
All citizens, resident of this state, being seventeen years of age, and under the age of
sixty-seven years, shall be subject to enrollment in the militia and the performance of
military duty, in such manner, not incompatible with the Constitution and laws of the
United States, as may be prescribed by law.
OmUo Co Ts. art. IX. The court noted that this provision "does not by its own force make adult
citizens of Ohio members of the organized or active militia, but merely subjects them to enroll-
ment in that body." Warin, 530 F.2d at 105 n. 1.
87. Id. at 104.
88. Id. at 105.
89. Id. at 104-05. This fact was stipulated to at trial. Id.
90. Id. at 105.
91. Id. at 104-05.
92. Id. at 106.
93. Id. (citing Omo REv. Cooa ANN. §§ 2923.11, 2923.17 (Anderson 1975)).
94. Id. ("There is no such exemption for members of the 'sedentary militia.' ").
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that state constitutional and statutory provisions must be incorporated
into the Second Amendment equation to determine the extent to which
the federal government may regulate firearms.95
The Warin court, in what could be characterized as dicta,9 then as-
sessed the constitutionality of the National Firearms Act's regulation of
automatic weapons. Rather than employing the Supreme Court's Miller
test, the court simply echoed the Cases rebuke of Miller as Second
Amendment precedent.9 Like the Cases court, the Sixth Circuit dis-
missed Miller as law from another, less technologically advanced era. 98
The court, however, did not provide an "updated" analytical model by
which to assess the relationship between a weapon and the purpose of
militias; it simply held that "there is absolutely no evidence that a sub-
machine gun in the hands of an individual 'sedentary militia' member
would have any, much less a 'reasonable relationship' to the preserva-
tion or efficiency of a well regulated militia.'' 99
This case-by-case approach, which emerged from Cases, reveals one
of the weaknesses of the state's right interpretation. In explaining away
the Miller reasonable relationship standard, courts have not offered any-
thing in its place.100 The result is that, while the Miller standard is still
cited, state's right courts utilize no legal standard whatsoever in deter-
mining whether a firearm is reasonably related to the (now) mysterious
"militia purposes."101
95. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
96. The court's Second Amendment inquiry could have ended when it was determined that
Ohio law did not confer upon Warin the right to possess his automatic weapon.
97. Warin, 530 F.2d at 106 ("Agreeing as we do with the conclusion in [Cases] that the
Supreme Court did not lay down a general rule in Miller, we consider the present case on its own
facts and in light of applicable authoritative decisions.").
98. Id. ("If the logical extension of the defendant's argument for the holding of Miller was
inconceivable in 1942 [when Cases was decided], it is completely irrational in this time of nuclear
weapons."). This argument is discussed infra in part IV.C.
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. Without standards, the types of weapons within the scope of Second Amendment "rea-
sonableness" depends solely upon individual determinations by each court.
101. In Cody v. United States the Eighth Circuit considered whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6)
(1970), which makes it unlawful for persons acquiring or attempting to acquire firearms and
ammunition to make false statements to a licensed dealer as to the lawfulness of a sale, infringed
on the defendant's Second Amendment rights. 460 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1010 (1972). Though the result under Miller would have been the same, the court an-
nounced its holding in a single sentence: "We find no evidence that the prohibition of § 922(a)(6)
obstructs the maintenance of a well regulated militia." Id. at 37. This ambiguous phrase is, of
course, not the Miller inquiry. It is not difficult to imagine situations where a federal regulation
could prohibit a type of firearm reasonably related to the efficiency of the militia while posing
no obstruction to its maintenance and preservation. Though the Cody court was not dealing with
the regulation of a firearm, but rather the regulation of an act, the court could simply have held
that making a false statement to a licensed dealer is not reasonably related to the efficiency and
preservation of the militia.
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3. The Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit affirmed'02 the district court's holding in Quilici'03
that the Second Amendment does not apply to states, but then went
further to conclude that the right to keep and bear handguns is not pro-
tected under the Second Amendment.'04 Although the Seventh Circuit
admitted its conclusion was mere dicta,1°m it speculated "for the sake of
completeness"'0 that the Miller decision limits the Second Amendment
to the militia purpose, and that handguns are not military weapons and
are thus unprotected.'07
The Quilici cases are not true collective right decisions. Once the Quil-
ici courts held that the Second Amendment had not been incorporated
against the states, the issues in that litigation ceased to have Second
Amendment relevance.'o The issues in the Quilici cases were whether
Morton Grove's handgun ban violated the Illinois constitutional right to
keep and bear arms and whether the ban violated privacy rights. ,
4. The Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit appears to have accepted the strong-form version
of the state's right theory." 0 In United States v. Hale,"' a 1992 decision,
Hale challenged his conviction of thirteen counts of possession of a ma-
chine gun" 2 and three counts of possession of an unregistered firearm."'
Hale argued that the statutes under which he was convicted exceeded
Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce and that the indict-
ment violated his Second Amendment rights." 4
102. 695 F.2d 261 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
103. The district court opinion, 532 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D. I11. 1981), is discussed supra in part
ll.B.
104. 695 F.2d at 265.
105. Id. at 270 ("we briefly comment on what we believe to be the scope of the second
amendment").
106. Id.
107. Id. ("we do not consider individually owned handguns to be military weapons").
108. In interpreting the Second Amendment as applying only to the federal government, no
further discussion on Second Amendment jurisprudence was necessary.
109. Quilici, 695 F.2d at 265.
110. The Eighth Circuit embraced the state's right interpretation early on. See United States
v. Decker, 446 F.2d 164 (8th Cir. 1971); Cody v. United States, 460 F.2d 34 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1010 (1972); United States v. Nelsen, 859 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1988).
111. 978 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1614 (1993).
112. Id. at 1017 (possession of machine gun prohibited under 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (1991)).
113. Id. (possession of the unregistered firearm charged under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1991)).
114. Hale, 978 F.2d at 1017. The federal commerce clause power is subject to the Bill of
Rights. The federal government could no more use its interstate commerce and taxing powers to
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As to the second challenge, Hale argued that under Miller, federal
regulation of weapons susceptible to military use is barred by the Second
Amendment." 5 The court rejected this interpretation of Miller, citing to
the First Circuit's "illuminating" Cases decision as the proper ap-
proach.11 6 Though hinting that a machine gun might have militia utility,
the court focused on the status of the possessor, noting that since Miller,
"no federal court has found any individual's possession of a military
weapon to be 'reasonably related to a well regulated militia.'
' '91 7
Hale cited language from Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion
in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,"5 which classified the Second
Amendment right as an individual right, 19 to support an argument that
the Second Amendment protects individuals and not states "or collective
entities like militias.,,2' The court found Hale's argument "inapplicable
to this case" and "irrelevant" given its finding that Hale's possession of
the machine gun was unrelated to the preservation or efficiency of a
militia.' However, the court did acknowledge that in light of Verdugo-
Urquidez, the Second Amendment might possibly protect individual
rights. 2
regulate firearms out of existence than it could use those same powers to regulate printing
presses, newspapers, and magazines out of existence. With its recent decision in United States v.
Lopez the Supreme Court limited the scope of the interstate commerce clause in the particularly
relevant context of federal firearms regulation. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). Through Justice Rehnqu-
ist, the Court held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988
ed., Supp. V), which made illegal mere possession of a firearm within 1000 feet of a school,
exceeded Congress's commerce clause authority. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634. While this decision
does not alter the Second Amendment analysis, it does cast doubt on federal regulation which
bans the possession of certain firearms.
115. Hale, 978 F.2dat 1018.
116. Id. at 1019-20. The Hale court provided a succinct summary of the Cases test:
After carefully examining the principles and implications of the then recent Miller
decision, the First Circuit concluded that the existence of any "reasonable relationship
to the preservation of a well regulated militia" was best determined from the facts of
each individual case. Thus, it is not sufficient to prove that the weapon in question
was susceptible to military use .... Rather, the claimant of Second Amendment pro-
tection must prove that his or her possession of the weapon was reasonably related to
a well regulated militia. Where such a claimant presented no evidence either that he
was a member of a military organization or that his use of the weapon was "in prepa-
ration for a military career," the Second Amendment did not protect the possession of
the weapon.
Id. at 1020 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
117. Id.
118. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
119. Id. at 265. The Hale court dismissed the Verdugo-Urquidez language as dicta. 978 F.2d
at 1020.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. "Whether the 'right to bear arms' for militia purposes is 'individual' or 'collective' in
nature is irrelevant where, as here, the individual's possession of arms is not related to the
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The Hale court put the cart before the horse. The Cases-type test
which the court employed to find Hale's possession of the firearm out-
side Second Amendment protection is itself based on the collective right
interpretation. In explaining its use of the Cases test, the court stated
that it could not conclude that the Second Amendment right is an indi-
vidual right.'2 This holding undermines the court's dismissal of Hale's
individual right/ Verdugo-Urquidez argument as irrelevant and inappli-
cable. After all, if the Second Amendment protects an individual right,
then courts should scrutinize the weapon only for its militia utility, and
should return to the Supreme Court's Miller test. However, since courts
have never developed tests to determine which weapons have militia util-
ity, it is uncertain whether a fully automatic weapon would fall under
the aegis of the Second Amendment.
Another notable aspect of Hale is the Eighth Circuit's apparent adop-
tion of the strong-form state's right interpretation. The court offered the
following historical analysis to support its position:
These militias were comprised of ordinary citizens who typically were
required to provide their own equipment and arms. The Second
Amendment prevented federal laws that would infringe upon the
possession of arms by individuals and thus render the state militias
impotent. Over the next 200 years, state militias first faded out of
existence, and then later reemerged as more organized, semi-
professional military units.12
The court added that states began providing arms and equipment to
these military units, which were eventually organized into the present
national guard structure. 2' The court then cited to Perpich v. U.S. De-
partment of Defense,'2 a 1990 Supreme Court decision affirming an
Eighth Circuit appellate decision.1 7 In Perpich, the Governor of Minne-
sota sought to enjoin the federal government from using Minnesota's
national guard to conduct military operations in Central America.12 The
Court examined the relationship between the militia and the National
Guard, and concluded that the federal government "provides virtually
preservation or efficiency of a militia." Id. at 1020. This language is a far cry from absolutist
state's right cases decided before the 1990 Verdugo-Urquidez decision. Cf. Stevens v. United
States, 440 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1971) ("there can be no serious claim to any express constitutional
right of an individual to possess a firearm").
123. Hale, 978 F.2d at 1019.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 496 U.S. 334 (1990).
127. The Eighth Circuit's opinion is at 880 F.2d 11 (8th Cir. 1989).
128. Perpich, 496 U.S. at 338.
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all of the funding, the materiel, and the leadership for the State Guard
units." 129 The Hale court recognized that Perpich was not a Second
Amendment case, but stated in a rather ciyptic fashion that "its discus-
sion of the militia gives further dimension to our analysis."' 130 Faced
with the extensive discussion in Miller casting the right to bear arms as
an individual right, 3 ' the Eighth Circuit declared that "[in Miller, the
Court simply recognized this historical residue.' '132 This characterization
is disingenuous. 3
After the Perpich discussion, and its own historical recount on the
supposed transformation of militias into the National Guard, the Eighth
Circuit held in distinctly strong-form language that '"Itlechnical' mem-
bership in a state militia (e.g., membership in an 'unorganized' state mi-
litia) or membership in a non-governmental military organization is not
sufficient to satisfy the 'reasonable relationship' test."' 1 The court then
cited to Warin, and offered the following misreading of that decision:
"Membership in a hypothetical or 'sedentary' militia is likewise insuffi-
cient." 3 '
The Eighth Circuit's strong-form approach in Hale is a study in con-
tradiction. One of the few things that the individual right and state's
right camps agree on is that the Second Amendment protects states from
federal interference with militias.1'6 To define the militia as the National
Guard, a professional military organization which exists at the mercy of
and under the direction of the federal government, is to render the Sec-
ond Amendment little more than wasted ink. The Eighth Circuit was
careful not to paint itself completely into a corner, but, short of crossing
one's eyes, it is hard to read the court's discussion as anything but an
acceptance of the strong-form state's right interpretation.
129. Id. at 351.
130. United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1019 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1614
(1993).
131. See supra part III.A. for a discussion of the meaning of Miller.
132. Hale, 978 F.2d at 1019.
133. It is unlikely that the Supreme Court would devote eleven paragraphs of a 17-paragraph
opinion to "historical residue." Justice McReynolds' discussion of the militia in Miller contrasts
the state militias with standing armies and explores the development of militias from the days of
King Alfred up to the time of the decision, when the right to keep and bear arms is conferred by
states upon citizens of the states. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178-82 (1939).
134. Hale, 978 F.2d at 1020.
135. Id. The court in Warin only held that Ohio's statutes did not exempt members of the
sedentary militia (i.e., the Ohio citizenry) from the dangerous ordnance law. See supra subsec-
tion B.2 of this part. The Sixth Circuit was examining Ohio's arms and militia provisions (con-
sistent with the weak-form state's right inquiry), and was not making a pronouncement of what
type of militia membership is reasonably related to militia purposes.
136. The individual right view is that state suspicion of federal oppression is only one of
several reasons for the right to bear arms.
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Judge Beam concurred in the result, but disagreed with the court's
collective right approach in light of the Miller decision. 137
5. Other Collective Right Federal Courts
Other federal circuits have utilized some form of the state's right view
in deciding Second Amendment cases, including the Third Circuit,' the
Fourth Circuit,'39 and the Tenth Circuit. 140
The Fourth Circuit's recent decision in Love v. Pepersack4 reaffirms
that circuit's acceptance of the collective right interpretation in an
interesting context. Love brought a section 1983 civil rights action
against various Maryland state troopers who improperly denied her ap-
plication to purchase a handgun. 42 Under Maryland law, if a criminal
records check of an applicant is not completed within seven days, a gun
dealer may legally sell the applicant a firearm . 4 The computer printout
of Love's record indicated that she had been arrested on four occasions,
but did not indicate the disposition of charges filed against her.'" With
the seven-day deadline approaching, the reviewing state police officers
denied Love's application based solely on her arrest record. 45 Love, in
fact, had been convicted only of a misdemeanor, for which she paid a
fine. '1 Love sued members of the state police under section 1983 for
violation of substantive due process, her "right to contract," and her
Second Amendment rights. 47
137. Hale, 978 F.2d at 1021. While Judge Beam agreed that an automatic machine gun is not
protected by the Second Amendment, he did not embrace the court's acceptance of the state's
right interpretation:
I disagree, however, that Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942); United
States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384
(10th Cir. 1977) and United States v. Nelson [sic], 859 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1988) prop-
erly interpret the Constitution or the Supreme Court's holding in United States v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 59 S. Ct 816, 83 L.Ed. 1206 (1939) insofar as they say that
Congress has the power to prohibit an individual from possessing any type of firearm,
even when kept for lawful purposes. Judge Gibson's [majority] opinion seems to
adopt that premise and with that holding, I disagree.
Id.
138. See United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1942), rev'd on other grounds, 319 U.S.
463 (1943).
139. See United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1974).
140. United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1977).
141. 47 F.3d 120 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, No. 94-1947, 1995 WL 334963 (U.S., Oct. 2, 1995).
142. Id. at 122.
143. Id. (citing MD. CODE. 1957, ART. 27, § 442(b) (1992)).
144. Id. at 122.
145. Id.
146. Love was convicted of participating in an obscene show. Id.
147. Id.
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As to her Second Amendment claim, Love argued that the state of
Maryland infringed upon her individual right to keep and bear arms.'1
The court disagreed, citing Presser and Cruikshank to hold that the Sec-
ond Amendment does not apply to the states.'49 The opinion should
have ended there, consistent with the collective right argument that the
Second Amendment applies only to regulation by Congress. The court,
however, then slid into a collective right analysis of Love's challenge to
federal regulation, and concluded that Love "has ... not identified
how her possession of a handgun will preserve or insure the effectiveness
of the militia."' 50 This second holding by the court is curious, given the
fact that Love challenged no federal law. The court's preternatural jaunt
into analysis of federal regulation can thus be characterized as grand but
excessive dicta, or perhaps as yet another example of the haphazard ap-
plication of the undeveloped state's right interpretation.'' The Love
court did acknowledge (if only impliedly) that the collective right ap-
proach is a creation of lower federal courts, and is not based on
Miller. 152
Appellate collective right decisions have trickled down to some federal
district courts. In United States v. Kozerski 5 3 the federal district court
of New Hampshire held that a convicted felon who analogized himself
to a "rural police officer" had no right to possess a firearm. 54 The
court cited Miller for the proposition that the Second Amendment is not
a conferral of a right but only a limitation of Congress, but then went
beyond Miller by holding that "the Second Amendment is a collective
right to bear arms ... and has application only to the right of the state
to maintain a militia and not to the individual's right to bear arms."'55
Other district courts have held that states may regulate or prohibit the
forming of private armies by citizens 56 and that a state may ban the use,
possession, manufacture, and transfer of assault weapons without
148. Id. at 123.
149. Id. at 123-24.
150. Id. at 124.
151. It is more likely the former, as language in the decision indicates recognition by the
court that it need go no further than the incorporation question.
152. The court noted that, in post-Miller decisions, "the lower federal courts have uniformly
held that the Second Amendment preserves a collective, rather than an individual right." How-
ever, the court did not cite to Miller for this proposition: "This court's precedent is [the court's
own 1974 decision in] United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1974)." If the Fourth
Circuit had viewed Miller as a state's right case, there is little doubt that it would cite to the
higher court for that proposition.
153. 518 F. Supp. 1082 (D. N.H. 1981), aff'd, 740 F.2d 952 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
842 (1984).
154. Id. at 1090.
155. Id.
156. Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 543 F. Supp. 198 (S.D.
Tex. 1982).
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infringing on Second Amendment rights.' These cases were decided on
incorporation grounds, however, and cannot be considered true state's
right opinions.'58
C. A Summary of the Emerging State's Right Analysis
Application of the collective right interpretation in the federal
courts is erratic. However, the cases do support the following three-
part analysis: first, whether the person or thing has standing to assert
Second Amendment rights; second, what rights the state in issue has
conferred upon the person or thing asserting Second Amendment pro-
tection; and third, whether the Second Amendment protects posses-
sion of the particular firearm.
The analysis should not be viewed as a series of steps, but rather as
a set of components which are blended together as part of the Cases
test of the constitutional limitation of the Second Amendment.
The first component is whether or not the person or thing can assert
Second Amendment rights. Here, the courts fill in the blank in the
phrase "the right of [ . .] to keep and bear arms shall not be in-
fringed." Under the individual right interpretation, the blank will be
filled with "the people" as it is used throughout the rest of the Bill of
Rights. Under the state's right interpretation, the blank is of course
filled with the term "the states," though no court has yet reviewed a
case brought by i state, nor has any court followed a literal applica-
tion of the state's right theory by denying standing outright to anyone
except the states. Some commentators argue that this is because the
collective right decisions are in reality decisions based on the discrete
collectivist model. 15 9
As the cases discussed supra illustrate, the federal courts which have
adopted the state's right interpretation have-through implication-
filled in the blank with a variety of things. Weak-form courts such as
the First and Sixth Circuits hold that the Second Amendment protects
157. Fresno Rifle & Pistol Club v. Van de Kamp, 746 F. Supp. 1415 (E.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd,
965 F.2d 723 (1992) (reviewing challenge by state gun organizations of California's assault weap-
ons ban under CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12275-12290 (West 1989)). The court held that the Second
Amendment has no application to states, citing to Presser and Cruikshank. Id. at 1418. Counsel
for plaintiffs, which included noted Second Amendment scholar Stephen P. Halbrook, raised
interesting preemption and privacy arguments as well. Halbrook is the author of numerous
books and articles regarding the right to keep and bear arms, including STEPHEN P. HALBROOK,
A RIGHT To BEAR ARMS: STATE AND FEDERAL BIlL OF RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES
(Greenwood Press 1989), and STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: TrE Evo-
LUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (University of New Mexico Press 1984; reprinted Liberty
Tree Press 1989).
158. Since no federal regulation was at issue, analysis of the Second Amendment as a limita-
tion on Congress was not required.
159. This argument is discussed infra in part IV.
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states'60 and members of the state-defined militia.'6' The Eighth Cir-
cuit has adopted the strong-form state's right interpretation by filling
the blank with the phrase "members of the National Guard."1 62
The second component is the regulatory and constitutional frame-
work of the state. This inquiry emerged from the principle in Cases
that "[w]hatever rights . . . the people may have [to keep and bear
arms] depend upon local legislation,"' 163 and later from Warin, in
which the court analyzed how Ohio defined its militia and what weap-
ons it allowed militia members to own.1" Regardless of the validity of
its origins, the state's right premise is that the sole purpose of the Sec-
ond Amendment is to protect the ability of states to maintain armed
militias free from federal interference. If this premise is to remain
consistent with application of the collective right interpretation, then a
fortiori states must have a say in how their respective militias are to be
organized and equipped. Strong-form courts pass over this step, con-
sistent with their argument that state militias have over time metamor-
phosed into the federally-controlled National Guard. 65
The third component is whether the firearm is within the protection
of the Second Amendment. Under Miller, firearms having a militia
utility are within Second Amendment protection. I6 Some courts, be-
ginning with the First Circuit in Cases, have limited the Supreme
Court's Miller test to the facts before the Court in its 1939 decision,
and contend that the Miller court never reached the question of the
extent to which a weapon with militia utility may be regulated. 167
Courts which have so limited Miller point to the development of
nuclear weapons, machine guns, trench mortars, and similar weap-
onry to support their claim that, if Miller is read literally, such weap-
160. See Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cit. 1971) ("the Second Amend-
ment right 'to keep and bear Arms' applies . . . to the right of the State to maintain a militia").
161. See United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948
(1976) (holding that defendant was not protected under the Second Amendment because Ohio
law gives "no such exemption [from an Ohio statute prohibiting possession of a dangerous ord-
nance] for members of the 'sedentary militia"' to carry automatic firearms).
162. See supra part III.B.4.
163. Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 921 (1st Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 770
(1943).
164. 530 F.2dat 106.
165. See United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1614
(1993).
166. See Dowlut, supra note 2, at 74 ("Miller holds that the Constitution protects the right
to "possession or use" of arms having militia utility, e.g., shotguns, rifles, and pistols."). The
Miller Court was presented with no evidence that sawed-off shotguns had militia utility. United
States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).
167. 131 F.2d 916, 922 (lst Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 770 (1943); see also Warin, 530
F.2d at 105-06.
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ons could not be federally regulated.1 6 Faced with such a prospect,
collective right courts have not only added the standing component to
the original Miller test, but they have combined the unrelated standing
and weapon inquiries into one test.
A traditional approach to deciding cases would suggest that the
court would first rule on the standing question and then separately
address the question of the constitutional limits of the Second Amend-
ment as applied to the weapon at issue. With their combined test, col-
lective right courts are able to avoid defining what and who
constitutes the militia, and also to avoid serious analysis of the militia
utility of a given firearm. Dowlut observed that some courts "make
no attempt to come up with a test [of which weapons are reasonably
related to militia purposes]; alarmist rhetoric has supplanted intellec-
tual vigor."' 69 The result is that the otherwise clear language of the
Miller test has been rendered a formality, allowing collective right
courts to simply rubberstamp congressional firearm regulation with-
out explanation of their holdings.
IV. THE SECOND AMENDMENT AS A BAR TO FEDERAL
FIREARMs REGULATION
Unless and until the Supreme Court revisits and clarifies the mean-
ing of the Second Amendment, portions of the federal judiciary will
likely continue to utilize the Cases test. However, this does not mean
that the citizenry cannot still enjoy the right to keep and bear arms.
By shifting Second Amendment rights from the individual, state's
right courts must now grapple with the vexing fact that-to make an
analogy to other laws of nature-the right to keep and bear arms must
go somewhere. Under the collective right interpretation, it is vested in
the artificial entity of the state. 1 0 Regardless of who or what asserts it,
the Second Amendment loses none of its prohibitory power as against
the federal government. To hold otherwise would constitute nothing
less than a judicial repeal of the Second Amendment.' 71
Many state constitutions acknowledge an individual right of their
citizens to keep and bear arms.' 72 However, states and militia mem-
168. The Warin decision provides the most extensive discussion to date of the standing in-
quiry as applied to members of the militias. 530 F.2d at 105-06.
169. Dowlut, supra note 2, at 74 (footnote omitted).
170. See supra part II.A.
171. This is just what the Supreme Court of Kansas did when it invented the nebulous entity
theory in City of Salina v. Blaksley, 83 P. 619 (Kansas 1905); see Dowlut, supra note 2, at 76-77
("In Kansas ... their guarantee to arms has been judicially repealed .... [Sleveral generations
later the Kansas Supreme Court obliquely retreated from Blaksley ....").
172. See Dowlut, supra note 2, at 84-89 (Appendix; noting that, as of 1989, 43 states had
constitutional guarantees to keep and bear arms).
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bers can still protect the right to keep and bear arms from federal
regulation and interference by using existing collective right caselaw.
This approach is possible only if the state at issue has the legal ma-
chinery in place to make such challenges, and is based on the idea
that, since some courts have made the Second Amendment a state's
right, states and state-defined militia members can assert it. Since such
challenges are based on the state's right interpretation, regulation of
firearms by the states themselves would not be prohibited under the
Second Amendment. 73
Challenges based on the weak-form state's right view will require
courts to flesh out collective right jurisprudence and to fill in the sig-
nificant gaps in that interpretation. Because collective right courts
have expanded the Supreme Court's Miller inquiry to include scrutiny
of both the weapon and the individual possessing it, 174 litigants should
be prepared to present evidence 175 on both issues.
A. Challenges Brought by States
No state has ever asserted its collective right to keep and maintain a
militia. 7 6 The crux of the state's right argument is, however, that the
Second Amendment "guarantees an exclusive right of the states,
which only the states have standing to invoke." 17 7 By allowing indivi-
duals in certain instances to claim Second Amendment protection, the
collective right courts have refused to apply the state's right
173. In Adams v. Williams, Justice Douglas, in dissent on a Fourth Amendment question,
speculated that:
[t]here is under our decisions no reason why stiff state laws governing the purchase
and possession of pistols may not be enacted. There is no reason why pistols may not
be barred from anyone with a police record. There is no reason why a State may not
require a purchaser of a pistol to pass a psychiatric test. There is no reason why all
pistols should not be barred to everyone except the police.
407 U.S. 143, 150 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas was likely basing his assertion
on incorporation grounds and the Presser and Cruikshank holdings, and not on the collective
right interpretation. In fact, in the next paragraph he cites to the Court's Miller test, noting that
"[t]he Second Amendment . . . 'must be interpreted and applied' with the view of maintaining a
militia."' Id. (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178-79 (1939)). He then quotes
Justice McReynolds' definition of the militia as "civilians primarily, soldiers on occasion." 407
U.S. 143, 151 (1971 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Regardless, as to state regulation, the result is the
same under either the incorporation holdings or under the collective right interpretation; after
all, there is little point in incorporating a right against the states which the states themselves own.
174. See supra part III.B.
175. As to the weapon prong, evidence could include affidavits or expert testimony from
firearms experts, historians, Second Amendment and/or militia scholars, and experts on military
affairs. As to the standing prong, evidence should include the relevant state constitution, any
state statutes regulating firearms or the militia, affidavits from the governor (or person charged
under the state constitution as commander of the state militia), and anything else that indicates
that the state's militia is comprised of its citizens.
176. Perpich v. U.S. Dep't of Defense involved federal control of the National Guard, not
the Second Amendment. 496 U.S. 334 (1990).
177. Kates, supra note 2, at 213.
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interpretation so narrowly. Collective right courts are faced with the
fact that the defendant's standing in Miller was, after all, never ques-
tioned by the Supreme Court.
That states themselves can bring Second Amendment challenges has
not been universally accepted. In their article, 17 Ehrman and Henigan
dismiss the attacks of commentators who question the reading by
state's right courts of the term "the people" in the Second Amend-
ment as a reference to the states (when contrasted to the meaning of
the term throughout the rest of the Bill of Rights), as being based on a
misreading of what the courts mean by the terms "collective right"
and "state's right.' '1 79 They posit that "[tihe courts have not held that
the second amendment right belongs to the states in the sense that
only the states, not individuals, may assert it.''18 To support their ar-
gument, they point to the fact that no court has rejected a Second
Amendment challenge by an individual on the basis that he lacked
standing because he was not a state.' 8 ' They conclude by stating that
the Second Amendment protects a collective and public interest, 82 and
that the decisive issue "has been whether the impact of the challenged
statute on the individual's own right to own firearms adversely affects
the state's militia." 183
Although they share the same collectivist premise, the Ehrman/
Henigan model differs from the discrete collectivist theory discussed
supra in part II.C. Under the discrete collectivist interpretation, the
right to keep and bear arms vests in the collective body which exists
between the individual and the state, and which can be asserted by
neither. 8 4 Thus, like Macbeth's apparitional dagger,' 81 5 Second
Amendment rights exist in theory but not in practice. Under the Ehr-
man/Henigan model, however, the prohibitory foil of the Second
Amendment materializes where necessary to protect the collective
public interest, and only then can be brandished by individuals (and
perhaps states).
178. Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 41, at 47.
179. Id. at 47.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 47 n.308.
182. Id. at 47.
183. Id. at 47 n.308.
184. See Kates, supra note 2, at 211 n.31 ("Under this theory constitutional right to arms
guarantees, whether federal or state, involve only a 'collective right' of the entire people, by
which is apparently meant a right that cannot be invoked by anyone either in his own behalf or
on behalf of the people as a whole.") (discussing City of Salina v. Blaksley, 83 P. 619 (Kansas
1905)).
185. Wm.LAm SHAKEsPEARE, TisE TRAGEDY OF MACBETH act 2, sc. I (Lancer Books 1968)
("Is this a dagger which I see before me,/ The handle toward my hand? Come, let me clutch
thee!/ I have thee not, and yet I see thee still./ Art thou not, fatal vision, sensible/ To feeling as
to sight? or art thou but/ A dagger of the mind ... ?").
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The Ehrman/Henigan approach to standing differs from the stand-
ing analysis of the state's right courts, in that it has the effect of re-
moving the traditional adversarial process from the litigation. The
court is placed in a trustee-like role, deciding how the militias are best
served and thus when standing either by an individual-or possibly a
state-is appropriate. Ehrman/Henigan collectivism thus allows
courts to rule essentially on the merits of the Second Amendment
claim before the claimant presents its case. The fact that commenta-
tors can interpret the case law in this manner exposes the troubled and
deliberately amorphous186 state of the courts' collective right interpre-
tation.
The most likely scenario for a state-based challenge would be a Per-
pich-type suit, 8 7 brought by a state governor or other official against
federal law that prohibits or regulates the possession of a weapon, use
of which is sanctioned by that state. Another possible scenario is a
challenge by a state of the federal prosecution of one of its citizens for
violation of federal law. For instance, in Warin, the state of Ohio
could have brought suit against the federal government for an uncon-
stitutional interference with its militia. It is unlikely that a state would
be denied standing in a federal court which accepts the state's right
theory, for to do so would require that court to run headlong into the
analytical infirmities of the discrete collectivist (nebulous entity)
theory.
Challenges to federal regulation brought by states involve the same
types of arguments as those brought by individuals. 88  Under the
state's right view, states must by definition be free to control and
maintain their militia without federal interference. 8 9 States determine
how their militias will be commanded and who will comprise their
membership. 90 Under their inherent police powers, states also
186. As collective right courts continue to drift out of sight from Miller, they have employed
in their decisions a guarded, and indeed pragmatic, conservatism. The state's right courts can be
analogized to a table of nervous diners, each one looking to the other to see which fork should
be lifted first.
187. Perpich was a case concerning the National Guard and did not address the Second
Amendment or state militias. Perpich v. Dep't of Defense, 496 U.S. 334 (1990). "In [Perpich]
the Court distinguished the 'National Guard,' the organized militia of the various states, from
the 'National Guard of the United States.' In reaching its decision, the Court did not need to
explore the nature of the unorganized, or constitutional, militia." Moncure, supra note 2, at 594
(citations omitted).
188. However, collective right courts will not be able to use the standing prong of the Cases
test to avoid discussion of the militia utility of the weapon.
189. Otherwise, the contradiction which plagues the strong-form interpretation arises. The
collective right interpretation becomes intellectually indefensible if the federal government is per-
mitted to control the state militias. The purpose of the Second Amendment is, under the collec-
tive right theory, to protect states from just that type of federal interference.
190. Id.
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determine which weapons may or may not be possessed and whether
members of the militia will be subject to such regulation. States thus
can assert their Second Amendment rights' 9' to challenge any federal
law which hinders the ability of state militia members to be armed
with weapons which are reasonably related to the efficiency or preser-
vation of the state militia.
B. The Second Front: Some Concerns of the State's Right Courts
Those who argue that the right to keep and bear arms is still an
important right are likely to encounter two common counter-argu-
ments, both of which stress how America has changed since the Bill of
Rights was first drafted. Some collective courts, including the weak-
form Cases and Warin courts,192 hint that technology has rendered the
right to keep and bear arms obsolete. The second argument is that the
United States has politically evolved beyond primitive, outdated
notions such as violent revolution.193 Those challenging federal regula-
tion under the collective right interpretation should be prepared to an-
swer these arguments.
The "technology" argument is based on false assumptions. The
fear of both the Cases and Warin courts was that, under the Miller
standard, the preservation of the states' ability to challenge federal
armed forces would justify individual ownership of advanced military
weaponry and even nuclear weapons. 94 It was largely this concern
that prompted the Cases court to disregard the Miller decision by limi-
ting it to the facts before the Supreme Court. 95 The problem with this
argument is that weapons which are used in warfare between nations
do not necessarily have militia utility. Indeed, a tyrannical state would
not likely use nuclear weapons to oppress the citizenry, since that state
would essentially be destroying itself. Thus, the citizenry would have
little use for nuclear weapons as a deterrent.
191. This assumes that the suit is brought in a state's right court.
192. United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976)
(in the age of nuclear weaponry, strict reading of Miller is "inconceivable"); Cases v. United
States, 131 F.2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 770 (1943) (given the military
weapons which emerged from the early years of World War II, Miller cannot be read as formu-
lating a general approach to the Second Amendment).
193. See United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1019 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1614 (1993) (individual right to keep and bear arms is "historical residue," and the national
guard structure has replaced the state militias).
194. This is a plausible reading of Miller:
Ironically, Miller can be read to support some of the most extreme anti-gun control
arguments, e.g., that the individual citizen has a right to keep and bear bazookas,
rocket launchers, and other armaments that are clearly relevant to modern warfare,
including, of course, assault weapons.
Levinson, supra note 2, at 654-55.
195. Cases, 131 F.2d at 922.
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Additionally, some courts imply that the militia purpose of the Sec-
ond Amendment is no longer a realistic pursuit in light of the arma-
ments possessed by the standing army. 19 Thus, Second Amendment
protections for the individual are unnecessary. This line of reasoning,
which was used by the Eighth Circuit in Hale,'1 is simplistic in that it
does not acknowledge other interests in the right to keep and bear
arms, such as the right to individual self-defense. Further, it ignores
the most important benefit of an armed citizenry; that is, as a deter-
rent to governmental overreaching. 198 Even with advanced weaponry,
the deterring effect of more than two-hundred million firearms in the
hands of the citizenry-which in effect become ground troops-can-
not be underestimated. Thus, oppression of an armed citizenry carries
with it much greater risk than oppression of an unarmed popula-
tion.'99
The second argument is that the United States has politically
evolved beyond the need for an armed citizenry. Professor Reynolds
characterizes the argument this way: "Maybe we have reached such a
stage of comfortable freedom and political stability that the likelihood
of oppression is so low, and the need for revolution or resistance so
far-fetched" that the purpose served by the Second Amendment is no
longer present.o Reynolds suggests that the political stability that
Americans have enjoyed is in part the result of the inclusion of the
right to keep and bear arms in the Constitution.20' In addressing the
"political evolution" argument, Levinson states that "it is hard for
me to see how one can argue that circumstances have so changed as to
make mass disarmament constitutionally unproblematic."202
196. The argument is that state militias cannot hope to stand up against the sophisticated
and powerful weaponry of the federal standing army. Kates addresses this assertion: "The argu-
ment that an armed citizenry cannot hope to overthrow a modern military machine flies directly
in the face of the history of partisan guerilla and civil wars in the twentieth century." Kates,
supra note 2, at 270 (citing the experience of the British in Israel and Ireland, the French in Indo-
China, Algeria, and Madagascar, the Portuguese in Angola, as well as the Americans in Vietnam
and the Soviets in Afghanistan).
197. United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1019 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1614
(1993) (asserting that militias have evolved into the current National Guard structure).
198. "[Ifn a free country like our own, the issue is not really overthrowing a tyranny but
deterring its institution in the first place." Kates, supra note 2, at 270.
199. "[A] state facing a totally disarmed population is in a far better position, for good or
for ill, to suppress popular demonstrations and uprisings than one that must calculate the possi-
bilities of its soldiers and officials being injured or killed." Levinson, supra note 2, at 657.
200. Reynolds, supra note 20, at 668.
201. Id. at 669 ("These good results should make us rather cautious about making wholesale
changes in [the Founding Fathers'] plan.").
202. Levinson, supra note 2, at 656. If the citizens of China kept arms, the massacre of
Chinese students in Tianamen Square in 1989 may not have occurred. Id. Tianamen Square
serves as a poignant example of the ability of political regimes to suppress and stamp out revolu-
tion and protest by an unarmed citizenry.
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Considering the enormous power and influence that the United
States presently wields throughout the world, many may view this na-
tion as indestructible. 20 3 History instructs that this belief is unrealis-
tic.204 There is little reason to believe that it is now safe to depart from
the Lockean view of the individual and government upon which the
United States was founded; that is, that government exists subject to
the consent of the governed.
C. Utilizing State Law To Protect an Individual Right To Keep and
Bear Arms Under the State's Right Interpretation
While the Eleventh. Circuit has not yet embraced the state's right
interpretation, the legislative framework in Florida provides a useful
illustration of how a collective right challenge to federal firearms reg-
ulation might be litigated. Article X, section 2(a) of the Florida
Constitution sets forth militia membership: "The militia shall be com-
posed of all ablebodied inhabitants of the state who are or have their
intention to become citizens of the United States; and no person be-
cause of religious creed or opinion shall be exempted from military
duty except upon conditions provided by law." 0 Florida has no
"subject to" clause, and thus no "sedentary" militia, so a court could
not maneuver around the standing issue as the Sixth Circuit did in
Warin.206 As for litigation in strong-form courts, Florida's constitu-
tion distinguishes between the state's militia and the "federally recog-
nized national guard," as do all other state constitutions and/or
statutes.
207
With Second Amendment standing established for virtually every
citizen of Florida, the next step requires examination of the state's
right to keep and bear arms provision. While collective right courts
hold that the right to keep and bear arms is not a right conferred upon
individuals, the First Circuit in Cases recognized that the federal gov-
ernment may not infringe upon rights conferred to citizens by
states. " 8 Article I, section 8(a) of the Florida Constitution provides:
203. Reynolds, supra note 20, at 669 ("We may try to convince ourselves that something in
the North American soil or climate renders us immune to these destructive forces, but it appears
more likely that our relative yanquility has resulted from a combination of luck and well-crafted
institutions.').
204. Id.
205. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 2(a).
206. 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976) (Ohio statute exempted only members of the organ-
ized state militia, not members of the sedentary militia).
207. "All states and the federal government have enacted provisions dealing with the militia
independent of the National Guard." Moncure, supra note 2, at 594-95 n.44 (providing citations
to the militia clause in each state constitution). Florida distinguishes between the National Guard
and the state militia statutorily as well as in its constitution. FLA. STAT. ch. 250.02 (1993).
208. Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 921-22 (1st Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 770
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"The right of the people to keep and bear arms in defense of them-
selves and of the lawful authority of the state shall not be infringed,
except that the manner of bearing arms may be regulated by law." 9
Thus, only the bearing of arms, and not their possession, is regulated
under the state's police powers. Article I, section 7 buttresses
Florida's right to bear arms provision by stating the familiar Lockean
principle that "[t]he military power shall be subordinate to the
civil."210
If the weapon at issue is banned by Congress but not by Florida,
the next step is to present the trial court with evidence of the military
utility of the weapon at issue through either affidavits or expert
testimony. Standing will have already been established, so the court
will be unable to maneuver around the original Miller weapons in-
quiry.
Also, the technological and "political evolution" arguments should
be met. Those bringing the challenge should proffer ways by which
the court can avoid holding that weapons of mass destruction are pro-
tected under the Second Amendment. Commentators have proposed
various legal tests by which courts could hold weapons of war beyond
Second Amendment protection, while still protecting handguns, hunt-
ing rifles, and other semi-automatic weapons." '
If the court properly and consistently applies weak-form state's
right case law, every citizen in the state of Florida will essentially have
an individual right to keep and bear arms, subject only to the state
legislature's police powers.
V. CONCLUSION
It is time for the Supreme Court to settle finally the individual
right/state's right debate. The Court's voice has been conspicuously
(1943) (Second Amendment not a conferral of rights but a bar to Congressional infringement of
state conferred rights). See discussion of the Cases decision, supra part lII.B.1. States can pro-
vide freedoms and rights which surpass those found in the federal Constitution. See, e.g., Wil-
liam J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as
Guardians ofIndividual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535, 548 (1986) ("As is well known, federal
preservation of civil liberties is a minimum, which the states may surpass so long as there is no
clash with federal law."). Whether a state's right to keep and bear arms provision clashes with
federal law depends upon how the courts interpret the militia utility inquiry of the Second
Amendment. The Constitution is, after all, the ultimate federal law.
209. FLA. CoNsT. art. 1, § 2.
210. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
211. Kates proposes a three-pronged test. To be protected under the Second Amendment,
Kates would require weapons to be (1) of the kind in common use among law-abiding people
today; (2) useful and appropriate not just for military purposes, but for law-enforcement and
individual self-defense as well; and (3) lineally descended from the kinds of weaponry known to
the Founders. Kates, supra note 2, at 259. Kates' test, though somewhat restrictive, is an exam-
ple of the type of legal test courts should have been developing after the Miller decision.
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absent, allowing several federal appellate courts to create the elusive
case-by-case collective right approach. Assuming arguendo the pur-
pose of the Second Amendment is to protect the right of states to
maintain militias without federal interference, it follows that federal
regulation which prohibits ownership of weapons that would other-
wise be legal under state laws is unconstitutional. If the state's right
interpretation is to be consistent with its premise, state's right courts
must first look to the constitutions and statutes of the states them-
selves.
The state's right interpretation has been used by some courts to
chisel away the citizen's right to keep and bear arms. It is in reality a
double-edged sword, sharpened on the cornerstone of its founda-
tion-its reliance on the term "militia." Weapons which have the
highest militia utility22 should, under the state's right interpretation,
receive the highest levels of protection from federal regulation. Collec-
tive right courts thus far have maneuvered around such questions by
rote invocation of the odd (but no doubt convenient) Cases test, by
which courts can deny Second Amendment protection to defendants
without explanation. Avoidance by collective right courts of such
troubling questions will continue to cast doubt on the validity of their
Second Amendment decisions.
212. Weapons such as the semi-automatic Colt AR-15 rifle, one of the weapons banned re-
cently by the federal government, see supra note I and accompanying text, can be considered
among those weapons most useful to the preservation and efficiency of state militias.
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